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Foreign Direct Investment: A Tool or a Target for 
Industrial Policy in Eastern Countries?
R E FL EC T IO N S U PO N EM PIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM  H U N G A R Y , 
PO LA N D  AND BU LG A R IA *
M. Isabel R.T. Soares
l aculdade de Economía, Universidade do Porto
Is there any linkage between industrial policy and the inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Eastern European countries?
This is the core question which is analysed and discussed in this paper. The 
transition process of Central and Eastern Europe to a market economy has 
raised a lot of challenging questions both to Applied Economics and to 
Management Science. Enterprise adjustment remains one of the most 
interesting and complex as it is closely related to a wide range of economic, 
policy and management issues. Foreign Direct Investment, privatisation and 
industrial policy and their sort of linkage, remain some of the most interesting 
factors in the transition process. It seems that no sharp distinction can be 
presented between FDI as a target and FDI as a tool for industrial policy, but 
national differences remain significant as well as enterprises adjustment 
capacity.
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member of the international research team.
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1 - Introduction
The transition process of Central and Eastern Europe to a market economy h 
raised a lot o f challenging questions both to Applied Economics and t 
Management Science.
Enterprise adjustment remain one of the most interesting and comple 
questions, as it is closely related to a wide range of different issues. Enterprise 
adjustment remains a core problem of the transition process and it is also 
connected to some of the main vectors of that process such as: Foreign Direct 
Investment, Privatisation and Industrial Policy.
Then, it seems quite useful to enquire about the linkage between the above 
three important factors of Eastern transition to a market economy.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and discuss this subject for three 
Eastern countries: Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary.
2 - Legal Framework of Foreign Investment
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines Foreign  D ir ect  In v e st m e n t  
as follows:
“Investment that is made to acquire a lasting 
interest in an enterprise operating in any economy 
other than that of the investors.”
This definition is quite vague mainly as the question of which percentage of 
ownership may be considered to give the investor a lasting interest. And 
differences between direct investment and portfolio investment remain unclear. 
Then as the worldwide practice does, we will consider that a minimum of 10%
'  Most of the research presented in this paper was prepared in the framework of the ACE programme 
(PHARE) of the Commission of the European Communities (ACE N° 92-0419-R).
ownership w ill correspond to a lasting interest. W e w ill define as w ell, ca se  by  
ease, Foreign  D irect  In v e s t m e n t .
In POLAND, foreign capital was first considered officially a relevant factor of 
economic growth in 1976 through a regulation of the Council of Ministers.
However, legal guarantees to potential investors were not enough: the 
investment should be made in a convertible currency, no credits were available 
from Polish banks, 30% of expected costs of the project had to be paid into a 
non-interest account at a Polish bank, as an advanced deposit, before a 
permission was issued, then being this deposit frozen until the project was 
executed up to 50% of its value. However, unexpected interpretations of 
ambiguous tax laws by fiscal officials and discouraging regulation concerning 
profits transfer, profits utilisation and ownership rights turned the investment 
environment quite hostile.
In 1982, a new attempt was made by the Parliamentary Act on Principles of 
Running Small-Scale Businesses on Poland by foreign legal and natural 
persons. By this Act, not only a state guarantee for invested capital was 
created, but also a scope of activities of foreign entities for “small business” 
was defined. Setting up a minimum entry capital of 50 000 US$ and a 
maximum employment of 200 people, it became a very important exercise for 
FDI in a centrally - planned economy (SZPRINGER, S., 1994).
The next legal step was most im port®  for the inflow of Foreign Capital in 
Poland. In 1986, the Polish Parliament passed a law enabling foreign investors 
to undertake business activities also in the public sector, allowing them to set 
up joint-ventures with Polish public enterprises. Companies were allowed to be 
run as commercial firms, being then subject to the Commercial Code, and 
foreign small manufacturing companies were regulated by the Civil Code.
Although there was no interference with relations between joint ventures (JV) 
partners and with the company’s internal relations, the law established some 
relevant restraints:
• The total value of the Polish contribution to the company’s equity should 
exceed that of foreign partners. Exceptions to this rule could be 
considered if there was no threat to the state security, but the permit was 
denied whenever an industry was perceived as strategic. That meant not 
only those activities linked to state security and to the protection o f state 
secrets, but also those, where foreign presence could be considered a 
threat to social and state economic interests.
Joint-ventures were completely banished from the Defence Industry, Railwa 
and Air Transport, Telecommunications, Insurance, Publishing (exc 
Printing) and Foreign Trade.
• Only registered shares were allowed. Land could be attributed only in 
the form of right to use it (RPU - Right of Perpetual Usufruct).
• A company was forced to resell a certain amount of its export revenuei 
in foreign currencies to a Polish foreign exchange bank, but tho 
remaining foreign exchange earnings could be freely used.
Despite a privileged position granted by the legislation - which included also 
free distribution of foreign currency profits among partners, freedom to transfer 
profits (by foreign partners) without a separate foreign exchange permit, 
foreign exchange credits (including mercantile credits) granted and exemption 
from corporate income tax during the first two years of business activity (and 
later, also from fax on the part of profits to be reinvested) among other 
advantages - there was a small interest of foreign investors in this form of 
cooperation. Environmental, economic and organisational variables seemed to 
have been more relevant than legislation. Among those variables, some of them 
have been decisive: company’s accounting system, cost-base pricing, central 
raw materials distribution, information requirements, land transport facilities.
In 1988, the Polish Parliament passed a new Act, later modified in 1989 and 
again in 1990, in connection with the Privatisation Act. This law (1988) 
became the only legislation under which FDIs could be undertaken. Any 
natural person in possession of convertible currency - except Polish citizens 
permanently living in Poland - and any economic entity - except Polish 
enterprises - could be a foreign investor in Poland. New participated (by 
foreign investors) ventures could be set up either in the form of a limited 
liability company or a joint stock company. However, only registered shares 
could be issued (by those companies) and the transfer of shares or stock among 
the shareholders required a permit from the central administrative organ. Those 
companies could retain a great amount of their export earnings and they were 
exempted from paying corporate income tax, enjoying tariff preferences as 
well. The shareholders had the right to sell their shares after notifying the 
President of the Foreign Investment Agency, and the foreign partner had the 
right to transfer abroad the proceeds from the sale of his shares or from the 
dissolution of the company. The minimum contribution of a foreign partner to a 
company’s equity was set at $US 50000Mhich was to constitute at least 20% 
of the starting capital o f the firm.
finally, in 1991 the Parliament passed a new Act regulating the principles of 
foreign direct and portfolio investments in Poland. Not only this new legal 
framework reflected political changements in the Polish economy and society 
•.¡nee 1989, but also a clear breakage with the inherited central planning legal 
\ystem. Companies with foreign capital participation should assume the form 
of companies and only some - although quite a few - cases required a permit 
prior from the Minister of Privatisation to be registered (SZPRINGER, S. 
1994). Most important in this law was that it ended the automatic 3 year period 
of exemption from corporate income tax, introducing, simultaneously, tax 
incentives for those investors whose start-up capital contributions exceeded 
2mn ECU.
Two other very important features were:
(i) On one side, tax relief also granted to investors:
• who locate their companies in high structural unemployment regions, or
• who introduce modem technology into the economy, or
• whose exports amount at least 20% of produced goods and services
(ii) On the other side, the 1991 Law allowed to transfer the total net profit, 
being the foreign employees of the company allowed to transfer their 
salaries without a separate foreign exchange permit Foreign investment 
security is guaranteed by international agreements on mutual protection and 
investment promotion.
In 1987, the so-called FDI legislation was first published in BULGARIA. 
Although rather limited as it concerned only joint-ventures, it has established 
rather flexible conditions to that kind of investment. Later, in 1992, the 
Parliament of BULGARIA passed a law on the economic activity of foreign 
persons and on the protection of foreign investments. For the Bulgarian law, 
foreign investment shall be every investment of a foreign person or through a 
branch or a company with foreign participation exceeding 50%.
Foreign investments should assume different forms (CHANKOVA, L. 1994)
• stocks and shares in companies
• ownership, rights and limited real rights in property (immovable)
• company ownership
• bank deposits
• debentures, government bonds and other securities issued by the state or 
by the Bulgarian legal persons
credits with a core than 5 years term 
ownership of immovable property by a 
participation exceeding 50%
company with a foreign
Registration is obligatory, but as the Las^sdoesn’t foresee any consequences in 
its absence, the result is that only 30% of the accomplished FDI are registered.
The most common form of registered FDI are companies with foreign 
participation and a minimum capital according to the Trade Law. As later 
investments don’t increase the company capital, they are not considered in the 
final amount o f foreign investment.
Information on a Foreign Investments has been done by three different 
institutions - the National Statistical Institute, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce which have not any kind of coordination 
between them. Although a certain change of the situation is expected in the 
near future, the present situation makes evident that, both the legal framework 
and the FDI control also contribute - together with macroeconomic stabilisation 
problems - to the poor performance of FDI in BULGARIA.
In HUNGARY, FDI is defined as “all the money inflows throughout the 
National Bank of Hungary - except loans and deposits, plus non-cash 
contribution registered by the registration court as part of the establishment of 
new business organisations or that of official capital increase”
In this sense, the Hungarian definition of FDI is similar to the Portuguese 
definition and different from the Spanish definition.
However, an accurate estimation about the size of foreign capital invested in 
HUNGARY remains difficult due to some statistical problems: different data 
sources, different methods and different registration units. The National Bank 
of Hungary (NBH) registers only the money inflows then excluding loans and 
deposits. The Registration Court registers non-cash contributions as part of the 
establishment of new business organisations or that of official capital base 
increase. The Ministry of International Relations estimates on the basis of the 
National Bank data (cash contributions) and on the foreign trade statistics 
(registered non-cash contributions). Even more complicate, is that the real 
amount of Foreign Capital inflow can be different from that registered, by three 
main reasons:
• the Registration Court doesn’t sum up the amount of registered equity 
capital of the business organisations and doesn’t make any special 
registration of foreign investments.
• there are no data about changes in the capital base of foreign-owned (fully 
or partly) companies
• about 10% of the total registered capital inflows are speculative (SASS, 
M. et all, 1994)
Although there is a legal possibility to establish a company with foreign capital 
since 1972, the legislation (and macroeconomic conditions) remained quite 
restrictive until 1989. This has been translated into a very small amount of 
foreign investment in HUNGARY in the period 1972-1989: only 227 joint 
ventures (about 23 million US$).
foreign investment in Hungary may take currently different forms :
• joint ventures (JV)* *
• a company set up by a foreigner
• acquisition, by a foreigner, of the equity of a company
’Hiere is a close connection between FDI, the privatisation process and the 
legal framework (Act XXIV / 1988 - which came into force on the 1st January 
1989 - later amended in December 1990, March 1991 and September 1993).
While noticing is that foreign participation in association is subject to some 
restrictions, namely:
• foreign participants must pay cash for shares in hard currency
• in a limited liability company, foreign participation is allowed only in 
registered shares, not bearer shares
• foreign participation in a Hungarian financial institution exceeding 10% 
of the share capital is subject to the approval of the Hungarian 
authorities
Non-cash contributions may take the form of any marketable tangible asset, a 
new tangible result of creative activity or an individual right representing 
money or the value of money.
The most common form of foreign capital investment in HUNGARY is the 
Joint Venture (JV). The latest reliable information about the number of wholly
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* It is possible to establish a 100% foreign owned company
”  Jvs may buy real estate required for their activities
or partly foreign-owned companies exceeded 17500 in October 1993 (SASS, 
M. et all, 1994).
The legal regulatory framework was an important tool to attract foreign 
investment: 1990 was the starting year of a significant wave of capital inflow, 
when the regulatory framework concerning investment was almost ready, 
together with irreversible changes into a market economy and a democratic 
society.
Compared to other countries of the region, HUNGARY presents - beyond 
other advantages- a well established legal framework concerning foreign 
investments, as well as a rather generous system of financial incentives up till 
the end o f 1993.
When we establish a comparison between FDI conditions in HUNGARY with 
its main competitors in this field - CZECHOSLOVAKIA first and now the 
CZECH Republic and the other countries - we notice that besides some 
common features, such as free repatriation of earnings and possible 100% 
ownership, the Hungarian system has become similar to them because no 
significant form of incentives is to be offered after 1993.
However, even after 1993, it’s still an open question to know if some of those 
incentives should be articulated with strategic options of industrial policy issue.
3 - FDI and Macroeconomic Environment: A Survey
POLAND may be considered a moderately attractive country for foreign 
investors. Table 1 presents an overview of the Polish recent economic 
evolution.
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Table 1 - Recent Evolution of the Polish Economy (1989-1993)
Real Growth (%/year) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
GDP 0.2 -11.6 -7.6 1.5 4.0
EXPORTS 2.6 15.1 -1.7 1.4 -0.2
IMPORTS 4.3 -10.2 31.6 9.2 15.1
Total Consumption = Private 
Consumption + Public 
Consumpt. -1.3 -11.7 3.3 5.0 6.7
Private Consumption -0.3 -15.3 7.4 5.2 7.8
Government Consumption -4.6 0.5 -6.5 4.5 3.5
Total Investment 5.1 -24.8 -14.2 -2.5 15.3
Gross Fixed Investment -2.1 -10.6 -4.5 2.8 8.5
Á Stocks 26.0 -56.7 -59.4 -61.2 213.6
A Stocks as a % of GDP 9.3 4.8 2.0 0.7 2.1
GDP (billion zlóti) 115.3 592 824 1143 1546
EXPORTS 19.8 161 190 242 319
IMPORTS 14.9 110 188 255 375
Trade Balance 4.9 50 2 -12 -56
Trade Balance (mn USD) 3.4 5.3 0.2 -0.9 -3.1
GDP per capita (th zl) 2910 14025 21489 30118 41646
GDP per capita (in USD) 2015 1498 2040 2113 2270
GDP Deflactor (annual average) 398.5 580.1 150.9 136.6 130
Consumer Prices (year end) 639.6 249.3 60.4 44.3 37.6
Consumer Prices (average) 251.1 585.8 70.3 43 35.3
Net Monthly Wage (ths zl) 206.8 1030 1756 2439 3263
Net Monthly Wage (in USD) 143 108 166 182 179
Wage in Real Terms (%) 10.9 -27.4 0.2 -2.9 -1.1
National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
Refinancing Credit Rate 61.3 103.8 53.9 39.0 35.4
Commercial Credits - Prime Rate 68.0 119.8 62.0 49.0 39.0
Exchange Rate of USD 
Official - average in year 1446 9500 10583 13631 18145
Free market - average in year 5565 9570 10726 13647 17983
Source: Calculations by J. Rajski and Z. Szpringer, Institute of Finance 
(Warsaw, 1994)
Although GDP has been increaâfif significantly and price growth rate 
decreasing (see Table 1), the inflation rate remains high and the balance of
9
payments deficit is still impressive (in 1993, POLAND had a deficit about US$ 
2,3 bn).
For most international business sources, POLAND has a low rating on the 
“country risk” list which - together with the performance of some economic 
indicators - doesn’t encourage foreign investment. According to SZPRINGER 
(1994) only three factors are considered as being favourable to Foreign 
Investment:
• the market size
• the right to purchase real estate
• low wage level, unit wages and labour supply
On a three level scale of factors (unfavourable, moderately favourable and 
favourable), most of those factors as well as the most important, are considered 
unfavourable to Foreign Investment: from problems concerning raw materials 
supply and lack of labor skills, to the inefficiency of different levels of public 
administration, social instability and poor international economic links, among 
many others from a total of sixteen pointed out by SZPRINGER, (1994).
In short, foreign capital represented only 3.5% of GDP in 1993 (1,8 of GDP in 
1992), while foreign owned (totally or partially) companies accounted for 8% 
of total revenues of economic entities (1992) and even increasing in 1993 
(although no available reliable data can be presented).
As well as the above impact, that of FDI on foreign trade and on current 
account balance wasn’t rather strong, either. The share of foreign participated 
companies on total exports was 10% and the % on total sales was 21,6% (1992 
data).
The share of foreign participated companies on employment was about 2% in 
1992 (1,3% in 1991) but this share was higher in industry (4,0% in 1992).
Despite the flexible conditions of the Bulgarian joint venture legislation, the 
performance o f FDI in BULGARIA remains disappointing. Since 1990 
(beginning of the political and economic transition process) till the mid-1993 
(latest available data), FDI didn’t exceed 167 billion USD, hardly 
corresponding to 1.6% of BULGAM^l GDP for the same period. If  we 
consider that BULGARIA laggs much behind the rest of European countries,
being Albania the only country with a worse performance, that can be quite 
significant.
Perhaps BULGARIA geopolitical position shouldn’t be undervaluated as an 
important explaining factor for the small FDI inflow. But, to be realistic, other 
! actors must be taken into account, namely the difficulties of the 
macroeconomic stabilisation carried out in a very unfavourable external 
environment and the slow process of systematic structural transformation of 
ownership forms.
The macroeconomic stabilisation has started in February 1991 under an 
agreement with the IMF. At the beginning of the 90’s, the situation denoted a 
deep macroeconomic disequilibrium, provoking a sharp drop of GDP, 
shortages of goods, a declaration of a moratorium on the external debt and the 
intensification of the inflation rate.
The three main targets of the economic reform - the introduction of an efficient 
market system based on incentives and adequate institutional infrastructure, the 
monetary stabilisation and the structural adjustment of the economy - have 
been hampered either by internal and external factors. Among them, we may 
quote:
• the moratorium on foreign debts (since April 1990)
• the lack of negotiation on debts to foreign private banks
• the costs of the embargo to ex-Yugoslavia which involved significant 
losses in trade and services (sustained only in 1994)
Recent evolution on the Bulgarian economic situation may be summarised by 
two contrasting features:
• on one side, a certain progress, although modest, in the institution of a 
market economy
• on the other side, a deep recession of the real sector, mostly as a result 
of the poor performance of the state companies and the small growth of 
the newborn private sector
Foreign Direct Investment faces several obstacles, some of which may be 
assumed as a paradox. For instance, the privatisation process remains delayed 
and biased against foreign control*. But the confusion of property rights and its 
restitution also present severe implementation problems.
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* For example, there is reluctance to permit outright foreign control of land and foreign investments in 
some branches have a case-by-case analysis and administration
Also, both the price liberalisation and the loss of former external markets, h f l  
negative effects on capital stock and human capital. High debt positioB 
towards the banks and between companies have delayed the p r iv a tisâ t»  
process and foreign investors evaluation of assets has become highly c r i t i c j  
risk considerations as well.
Positive features o f stabilisation and economic reform have been the creatiafl 
and functioning of the foreign exchange market, as well as the advancement ill 
the domestic convetibility of the national currency. All of them are criticw  
factors related to FDI, as the technical ability to repatriate profits depend onl 
them. In this field, advancements have been important, although foreign! 
investors still face the risk of the Bulgarian currency (levs) being beset by j  
inflation rate (about 70%/year) with unavoidable depreciation devaluation. But 
these risks have become more predictable, as rapid moves to liberalize 
domestic prices have been implemented systematically.
The monetary sphere has suffered one of the most radical changes. The 
implementation of a restrictive monetary policy has raised considerably the 
mterest rates, then avoiding hyperinflation, helping stop the dollarization of the 
economy and helping to create/recover (?) confidence on the national currency.
Then, stabilisation has brought two main changes in the monetary situation:
• a considerable raise of interest rates
• a rapid development of commercial banks
However, economic stabilisation is far from being achieved.
Transition costs have been / are increasing, which is closely related to severe 
problems of state budget deficits and to the restrictive monetary policy. 
Deviations between targets and results remain impressive for GDP growth rate 
and GDP structure, balance of payments and foreign debt, inflation rate, 
unemployment, budget deficit and domestic debt, real income and consumption 
(Tables 2, 2-A, 3, 4 and 5, annex I).
The economic situation in Bulgaria has determined the forms o f Foreign 
Investment penetration: “greenfield” investments, cooperation with Bulgarian 
partners and participation in the privatisation. Greenfield investments are still 
dominant, by a set o f reasons we have discussed before. FDI is small and most 
representative in those sectors where smaller investment amounts are required 
(and a better ratio investment profit ma^be achieved): trade, services, tourism 
and food industry. Larger investments are still in a preparatory stage.
Kjp t¡n 1993, H U N G A R Y  was the most successful country in Central and 
■ustem  Europe concerning Foreign Capital. Despite some statistical problems 
ijiioted before, the whole amount of foreign capital (including other than cash 
Upport) was estimated to exceed 7 billion USD in February 1994.
A comparison can be made between HUNGARY s position in international 
hade and capital flows. In 1990, the share of HUNGARY in international trade 
amounted to 0.2% while its share in capital flows was about 1% (INOTAI, A. 
1993).
throughout the eighties no significant macrostructural shift were evident in the 
I ! tingarían economy (Table 6).
Table 6 - Structure of GDP (%)
Industry Consumpti
on
Agriculture
and
Forestry
Transport
and
Communications
Commerce
Other
Services Total
1980 37.2 8.0 19.6 9.1 9.7 16.4 100.0
1988
1991
36.2
26.8
6.5
5.3
21.1
10.0
9.2 8.4
43.8%
18.6
Sources: KSH Statistical Pocket Book 1989, p 101 (for 19080 and 1988) 
Economic Survey of Europe in 1992 and 1993, ECE,
Geneve - NY, 1993, p.78
However, 1991 data is already meaningful, particularly for agriculture where 
the government efforts to create a legal framework for the transition from a 
cooperative based property structure to a smaller private forms system have 
acclerated the decline of agricultural production. In 1992, the volume of 
agricultural output was 47.4% of the 1987 level. For industry the current 
scenario is apparently that of a “de-industrialisation . While industrial sales 
and output presented a small growth from 1980 to 1985, by the end of the 
decade (1988-89) a deep crisis has already started to be evident. The crisis 
covered practically all sectors of the Hungarian industry at the end of decade, 
without dramatic changes in the branch structure of gross output. For most 
branches, 1988 was the bottom of a negative trend: in 1988, the overall 
industrial investment had decreased by almost 20% of its 1980 level.
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Only one subsector (the brewery industry) has shown some growth along the 
1987-1992 period, presenting 1.5% growth rate in 1991 and 4.9% in 1992, 
Most companies in the subsector are foreign controlled.
Between 1987 - the last year of real output growth- and 1992, the output 
volume decreased by impressive amounts, as we can see in Table 7.
Table 7 - Decrease (%) of Output Volume in the Hungarian Industry
for the period [1987-1992]
Mining 42.4%
Electricity Industry 16.5%
Metallurgy 56.2%
Engineering 60.0%
Building Materials Industry 45.0%
Chemical Industry 35.2%
Light Industry 47.2%
Food Industry 23.0%
Total Industry 37.4%
Source: Statistical Information Industry, March 1993.
CSO of Hungary, Budapest, May 1993, in Tôrôk, A. (1994)
In the last 4 years, capital inflow had a positive effect on macroeconomic 
variables, mainly because it smothered the generally negative macroeconomic 
trends associated with the economic transition. These positive effects were 
mostly felt on GDP growth. However this impact was not uniforming. 
Greenfield investments and the purchase of state-owned enterprises assets 
during their privatisation. In the first case, the impact was twofold: on one side 
production increase and on the other side a weaker production decrease in 
those branches where the share of foreign capital exceeded the average one*.
The only case of a reduced positive impact of greenfield investments, can be 
found on inward oriented joint-ventures as a consequence of a crowding-out 
effect on domestic producers. However, most of greenfield investments are 
export oriented due to the small domestic market. Therefore, foreign capital 
contribution is clearly positive.
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'  SASS, M. 1994 remarks on this issues call the attention for the difficulty to distinguish between the 
impact of capital inflow on the production and other factors.
A more complicated case concerns the impact of capital inflow through the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. As a matter of fact, privatisation is 
generally accompanied by the reduction of production, with adverse 
consequences as income and employment, but also by, an improvement of 
efficiency in the middle-term although it is too soon, there is already some 
empirical evidence about the net effect winch depends on three main factors:
• the viability of the sold companies
• the market segment where they are operating
• the capital intensity of production (after being restructured).
I lowever, it must be clear that, in the short term, Eastern experience proves 
that the net effect of foreign capital on domestic production through 
privatisation has been negative, being associated with structural changes. 
Under a macroeconomic perspective, that decline must not be isolated from a 
clear improvement of efficiency, both on resource allocation and on 
production. And, at least in the Hungarian case, it seems clear that structural 
changes are more common on the reallocation of production factors within a 
given sector than in a sectoral basis.
4 - FDI, Privatisation and Firm Restructuring
Privatisation remains the most important way of foreign capital penetration in 
transition economies.
Although the inflow of foreign capital through the privatisation process has 
declined since 1993, foreign investment still plays a definitive role in the 
Hungarian privatisation process compared with other Eastern European 
countries. Between March 1990 and October 1993, foreign capital inflow 
through the privatisation of 269 companies* represented 40% of total Foreign 
Capital inflow.
Among the reasons for that decline - worlwide economic recession, a certain
loose of attractivity by compared to other countries, ..... - it must be
emphasized that the option(?)/only feasible solution in many cases was 
privatisation prior to restructuring. In many cases, foreign investor has realised 
by now, that it is cheaper to realise greenfield investments**.
* Greenfield investments are excluded from the dais.
** So far. more than half of the foreign investments in Hungary has been of such type (NOVAK, T., 
1993).
Privatisation before restructuring, means that the new owner will take care of 
the crisis management and the company restructuring. Of course, the sales of a 
company reflects this situation. However, most of the Hungarian companies 
suffer from some or all of a set of problems which would always imply 
restructuring and crisis management. As a matter of fact, most of them have 
financial, technological, marketing problems, as well as human resources 
serious constraints and they are working under uncertainty concerning 
privatisation or transformation. Bankruptcy legislation has also been forcing 
the need to restructuring and to crisis management.
But, for opposite reasons restructuring and crisis management may also, by 
“good” reasons, be linked to takeovers by foreign investors. This was the case 
o f LEHER (Electrolux), TUNGSTRAM (General Electric), 
INTERCSOKOLADE (Nestlé), the OROSHÁZA GLASS FACTORY - 
HUNGUARD (Guardian Glass), DEBRECEN TOBACO FACTORY 
(Reemtsma) and TELEFONGYAR (Siemens) (TÔRÔK, A., 1994).
Scarce or missing data and still a short time period, remain major handicaps to 
fully evaluate privatisation contribution (Annex 2) either to companies 
restructuring or to restructing of those sectors where greenfield investments are 
more relevant. As far as joint ventures their are coencemed impact on creating 
domestic supply networks remain rather limited.
In the case of POLAND, in 1992 - according to the Ministry of Privatisation -, 
foreign investors took part in the capital privatisation of 25 large state 
companies. In the same year, about 70% of sold companies have suffered 
agreement with foreign investors concerning
• modernisation investments
• environment protection investments
• social commitments limited to a certain period of time: job 
maintenance, social rights preservation.
In  1991, only 40% of sold firms had signed that kind of agreements.
In  1992, about 60% of foreign-participated companies used technology and 
machinery not older than 1 year. These companies were mainly participated by 
Belgium (92.9%), France (76.5%), Netherlands (72%), USA (70.6%), Canadá 
(69.2% ) and Denmark (68.4%). Elec£$gic industry and printing industry were
the most technological advanced sectors. Meanwhile, about 16_% of 
companies used technology older than 10 years (SZPRINGER, S., 1994).
Only 10% of large companies with foreign participation imported machinery 
and equipment which gives us an idea of how small technology inflow is!
As we have already described, the second phase of foreign investments in 
Poland is connected to the economic transition to a market economy. 
Ifrivatisation and greenfield investments are key factors of this transition, 
foreign investors participation is mainly in privatisation and building up the 
market environment through greenfield investments (creation of new private 
economic entities).
Considering Central-Eastern Europe investment risk POLAND is in the middle 
of the ranking list (quoted by SZPRINGER, 1994)
East Germany
Hungary
Czech Republic
POLAND
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Romania
In 1992 and 1993 the evolution of Commercial Law partnership was the 
following:
1992 1993
Joint - Stock 248 332
Limited Liability 9883 14835
Foreign Small - Scale Companies 686 647
Source: Polish Statistical Office
Most of foreign investment concern trade services (architecture) and transport. 
Meanwhile according to the State Agency of Foreign Investments (SAFI), 
foreign investment in POLAND is still growing:
1991  ____________ 0.6 bn USD
1992 _____________1.5 bn USD
1993 _____________ 2.8 1MUSD
March 1994 3.5 bn USD
USA investors are those whose capital participation in Polish compani 
attains the largest amount, followed by transnational corporations an 
international financial institutions, namely: International Finance Corporation 
(USD 123,4 mn), Swedish-Swiss Corporation ABB. (USD 100 mil), Unilevafj 
(USD 96 mn), Hewlett Packard (USD 2.5 mn), Cambridge Holding (USD I 
mn), AGA (USD 4.9 mn), International Bank in Poland (USD 14mn). These 
financial institutions provide not only credits, but also economic aid for
recapitalisation of Polish companies which present good future prospects bul 
poor capital.
Among large American companies, we may notice: Coca-Cola, 
International Paper, Curtis Entreprises, Procter Gamble, RJ 
Reynolds, Ameritech, Epstein Engineering, Pepsico, Levis Straus, 
Liquid Carbonic, Colgate Palmolive, CPC Int., Gerber, Beloit Corps! 
Macdonalds, International Fast Food, Greenbrier, VF Corp, 
Marriot, Cargill, Basic American Foods, Esso. Several large Italian 
companies are also there: Fiat (USD 260 mn), Fortrade Financing (USD 
55 mn), Lucchini Group (USD 34.8 mn).
Germany is the fourth largets investor (USD 288 mn): Siemens, Henkel, 
Trmbo, Linde, Bahlsen, BTS, Schôller, Benckiser, Volkswagen, MM, 
Merceds-Benz, AEG, Dr. Oetker, Aeskulapp, Schieder, Kronspan, 
Schroder Bonn, Mietabach Project, Ahlers Goldress. There are more 
German undertakings in small business than American.
Among French investors (USD 260mn), there are such firms as: THOMSON 
C o n s u m e r  E le c t r o n ic , He r s a n t , S ociété G enerale  L ’O r e a l , B e r n a r d  
M o t e u r s , Sa u r , CBC.
The sixth and seventh largest investors, Netherlands (USD 193mn) and Austria 
(USD 189 mn) are represented by well known firms, respectively:
- U n il e s v e r , A T T , Ph il lips , Pa m -G a s , Im eko-H o ld in g , N o r d isk  W a v in
- Il b a u  G m bH , B r a u  AG, W a r im pe x , A lpla , C r e d in t st a l t .
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Annex III, give a wider perspective of Foreign Capital 
features and performance in Poland.
As we have noticed before, greenfield investments have been dominant in 
BULGARIA. Up till now, industry hâ^freen attracting quite a small amount of
foreign investment: only 9.8% of total registered FDI, mainly in food and oil 
industries.
I he average size of these investments is small: about 180 thousands USD in 
1993. Moreover, largest investors are Greece and Turkey: the fonner with an 
average investment size of 150 thousand USD and the latter a 10 thousand 
l JSD average investment size.
Even German investments average size - 40 registered investments 
representing 8.9% of total foreign investment (February 1994) - was only 504 
thousands USD. Clearly, investment average size remains quite below a 
minimum standard to be considered potentialy effective for economic reform. 
They are also concentrated on sectors with small or no foreseen spillovers: 
61.9% of FDI is concentrated on Trade, Import & Export sector, and 8.9% on 
Services and Tourism.
On the other hand, although FDI may have advantages in the privatisation 
process, this is not the case in Bulgaria, as privatisation has been delayed in 
Bulgaria and political uncertainty remains.
5 -... and Industrial Policy? Some Final Reflections and 
Comments
The influence of general economic policy on industrial policy is often 
emphasized. In the case of Central - Eastern European countries, this item 
deserves a special attention, as the transition process as a whole remains 
complex, each country presenting particular features, difficulties and restraints.
Most of the times, it is economic policy which is critically involved with FDI. 
Namely through exchange rate, labour and competition policies.
It is not the aim of this paper to discuss industrial policies of Eastern countries. 
We don’t wish to debate the item industrial policy-economic policy either.
Our purpose is just to recognise how FDI is considered by industrial policy. 
Then, this means that the restructuring process of the industrial sector must be 
observed at a macro-level and at a micro-level. However, the former approach 
will involve necessarily some tools, which will not be restrained to industrial 
policy “strictu sensu”: employment policy, regional policy, export incentives, 
R&D policy.
Privatisation must be considered, in any case, a fundamental tool helping 
adjustment of industry to the market economy environment. Its impact may 
relevant on product/process innovation, on productivity and wage increase, o 
(increased) capital stock, on Capital Mobility, on Company restructuring, o 
the access to International Markets and Standards and on long term prospects 
for export increase.
An industrial policy approach means that FDI impact and attractiveness should 
be observed under two perspectives: structural change and competitiveness 
increase.
Let us start with the most dramatic case: BULGARIA. From our previous 
analysis, the conclusion seems evident: for the time being FDI doesn’t have 
any chance to make an effective contribution, neither to the Bulgarian 
industrial reform nor to the economic reform. BULGARIA has not applied a 
selective policy to attract FDI which could contribute to technological 
restructuring and to the opening of the economy. Then, up till now, FDI has 
been neither a tool nor a target for Bulgarian Industrial Policy for a set of 
reasons explained before. However, the explanation must take political and 
military situation in the region as significant factors.
From what we have observed for POLAND, the second phase of direct 
investments is connected with the economic transition to the market economy 
(the first phase is completely finished by now and was based only on joint 
ventures with state companies). In this second phase, FDI is involved in 
privatisation and in greenfield investments. The targets seem clear: 
management and technological changes in privatised firms, facilitating access 
to foreign markets, joining Polish firms with large foreign companies networks. 
In a third phase foreign investment incentives will be eliminated.
Foreign investors are mainly operating in Poland in the same branches as in 
their country of origin, being concentrated on trade (36.5% of foreign 
participated companies), construction (10.11), transport (9.9%), clothing 
(8.2%), food stuffs (6.0%), metal industry (5.4%), chemical industry (5.2%) 
and electronic industry (3.9%). Most foreign-participated companies have 
small initial capital: 74.8% of investments don’t exceed 250 ths USD. Only 7% 
of investments are above 1.1 mn USD.
In 1992, about 54% of foreign-participated companies exported goods and 
services, but 44.1% acted only on domestic market. Exporting companies 
operated mainly in the metal industry and clothing industry - respectively
40.7% and 40.5% - as well as those participated by German, Austrian and 
Canadian investors. Germany was the most important market for foreign- 
participated companies.
On the other hand, 69% of foreign-participated companies imported goods and 
services. However, as we have noticed before, only 10% of large foreign 
participated firms imported equipment and machinery!
Table 5 (Annex III) shows that electro-enginnering industry is the most 
important sectoral target for FDI in Poland: 35.2% of total investment in 30 
companies. Food industry (11%) and Telecommunications (8.3%) are much 
below. Light industry (3.9% of total investment), chemical products (3.5%), 
metal products (2.4%), full power industry (5.5%), mineral (4.0%) seem much 
less interesting to foreign investors.
This situation is not quite different from the Hungarian scenario. There, 
engineering industry seems to be also a priority target for FDI, followed by 
food industry and much below of light industries: respectively, 23.4 million 
USD in the first half of 1993 (46.4 million USD in 1992), 13.1 million USD 
(54.9 in 1992) and 10.0 million USD (16.6 in 1992).
However, at a micro-level, current sectoral targets of FDI in Hungarian 
industry and in Poland are not exactly the same. As a matter of fact, it must be 
observed that (Tôrôk, 1994):
• POLAND has more than half of FDI in industry, concentrated in one 
joint-venture (car industry): FSM-FIAT. The same case may be observed 
in the Czech republic (SKODA-VW). HUNGARY seems to offer a 
much more dispersed scenario. For the same example-the passenger car 
industry - four major FDIs GM, SUZUKI, VW-AUDI and FORD are 
together only 40% of FIAT investment in FSM-Poland.
• in POLAND, some large FDI was planned to become a specialised part 
of worlwide production networks. This is the case of FIAT which builds 
“CINQUECENTO” cars only in POLAND*. On the contrary, the 
Hungarian case is mixed: GM HUNGARY produces for HUNGARY 
and neighbouring countries, small PHILLIPS investment produces only 
for the region. This is also the case for NESTLE, ELECTROLUX, 
SUZUKI and PRINGHORN for example. But, GM HUNGARY, as well 
as FORD and AUDI HUNGARY, are also important as upstream plants,
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• However, FSM plants use more Italian parts than the value of parts exported to FIAT
selling respectively engines and pumps (and engines) to Western 
Europe. The same reasoning is true for TUNGSRAM (GE HUNGARY), 
NESTLÉ and LEHEL/ELECTROLUX.
• Car industry examples in HUNGARY and POLAND (also in the Czech 
Republic) are clearly examples of vertical product differentiation or 
vertical intra-group integration. NESTLÉ and TUNGSRAM cases 
represent a high level of intra-firm integration as the products of those 
Hungarian subsidiaries of multinational are completely standardised and 
so, they are perfect competitors of similar products of other European 
plants in the same group.
In this sense, these cases must be recognised both as targets for industrial 
policy and as tools because they have a clear demonstration effect.
But although FDI inflows may be similar on a sectoral basis, a micro analysis 
gives us relevant differences, which may influence structural change and 
competitiveness.
We think that HUNGARY, may be in a better position to use FDIs attraction 
as an important industrial policy target. No doubt, that FDIs in HUNGARY 
and POLAND can also be used as tools for fostering industrial development. 
But how can they contribute to industrial restructuring?
A macro-level, this contribution will depend on the magnitude of FDI, on 
regional concentration of FDI, on target industrial sectors and on the average 
size of investments. Spillover effects will depend not only on the target sectors 
(car industry, fine chemistry, consumer electronics...) but on domestic 
subcontractors network that will be created. While the Hungarian market is 
small, the Polish market is relatively large. This may give POLAND special 
conditions to expect spillovers generated by the attraction of other FDIs by 
FDIs already established in the country. However, it doesn’t seem the case for 
HUNGARY.
The modernisation of major infrastructures, such as telecommunications, 
should attract major investors (FDI incentives should be carefully considered) 
and, through synergetic positive effects, could attract other FDIs.
Finally, we must say that some more years will be needed to evaluate the FDI 
impact on the micro-level restructuring. The privatisation process should be 
more advanced, either in Hungary and in Poland, and more time should be 
given to foreign investors, in order to im p^nent strategic changements and to 
make internal reorganisations.
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Table 4
S T R U C T U R E  O F  N A T I O N A L  I N C O M E  B Y  S E C T O R
Inlust- Construe- Agri— Forest— Tran— Cotnmuni— Trade, ma— Other
Years Total ry tion culture ry sport cations terial- sectors
technical of mate- 
supply and rial pro- 
purchase duction
1980 100.00 48.46 9.29 16.50 0.39 7.13 0.96 13.75 3.52
1981 100.00 47.60 9.41 19.08 0.37 7.29 0.95 12.62 2.67
1982 100.00 53.56 9.66 19.78 0.36 6.89 0.97 6.06 2.73
1983 100.00 56.50 9.67 16.46 0.34 6.82 1.04 6.51 2.66
1984 100.00 56.57 9.50 18.11 0.35 6.60 1.07 5.33 2.45
1985 100.00 59.61 9.78 13.46 0.34 5.96 1.14 7.08 2.63
1986 100.00 62.11 9.55 14.74 0.39 4.88 1.65 4.57 2.12
1987 100.00 58.75 9.44 13.10 0.38 5.53 1.73 8.82 2.24
1988 100.00 58.08 9.45 12.62 0.37 7.03 1.79 8.40 2.26
1989 100.00 57.15 9.27 12.32 0.29 7.21 1.85 9.44 2.47
1990 100.00 48.84 8.31 21.66 0.25 7.00 1.72 10.49 1.73
1991 100.00 50.61 5.76 19.29
1992 100.00 53.87 5.94 13.90
Table S
E M P L O Y M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R S
Relative Share
Indices 1989=100 of the employed
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 ----------------------------------------
(thous.)
1990 1991
W
1992 1989 1990 1991
(%)
1992
Total 4385 3824 3205 2653 87.6 73.4 60.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Industry 1646 1457 1195 1004 88.5 72.6 61.0 37.7 38.1 37.3 37.8
Agriculture 814 672 570 401 82.6 70.0 49.3 18.6 17.6 17.8 15.1
Construction 361 312 222 168 86.4 61.5 46.5 8.3 8.2 6.9 6.3
Services 1544 1383 1218 1080 89.6 78.9 69.9 35.4 36.2 38.0 40.7
Transport 247 231 201 174 93.5 81.4 70.4 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6
Trade 395 311 240 175 78.7 60.8 44.3 9.0 8.1 7.5 6.6
Communications 44 45 45 43 102.3 102.3 97.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Other services 858 796 732 688 92.8 85.3 80.2 19.7 20.8 22.8 25.9
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Table
Share of foreigners in enterprises under SPA control on 
December 1993
state share 
million Ft.
Foreign share 
million Ft. %
Fo o d  industry 96.450 14.361 13
Te x t i l e  industry 11.778 1.246 8
p a p e r  industry 2.950 489 14
Cheramical production 6.726 1.047 14
m achine industry 21.178 462 3
Electronical production 3.551 999 22
Furnitur eind. 4.402 81 2
Constrution industry 19.047 1.332 7
T r a d e 76.625 1.681 2
in privatization.Mimeo. IWE HAS, 1994
Table
Foreign share in enterprises sold in 100 % in industrial 
sectorial division, 31 December 1993.
state share 
million Ft.
Foreign share 
million Ft. %
Food industry 13.362 32.631 71
Tobacco Industry 212 5.375 96
Te x t i l e  industry 3.694 1.092 23
pa p e r  ind. 630 1.673 72
Cheramical products 334 962 74
M a c h i n e  industry 1.663 5.450 77
electronical production 164 999 86
Furniture industry 1.770 219 11
Construction industry 2.004 3.510 63
Trade 16.368 2.203 12
in privatization.Mimeo. IWE H A ^ 5 1994.
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
1. Table
Foreign investments In privatization
Companies
nr.
Companies 
Bn Ft
Share
%
Germany 74 77,18 27,73
USA 25 59,39 21,34
Austria 99 39,43 14,17
Great-Britain 30 20,78 7,47
France 34 19,38 6,96
The
Netherlands
13 18,29 6,57
Sweden 8 9,67 3,47
Svitzerland 12 9,33 3,35
Italy 21 6,49 2,33
Belgium 7 5,84 2,10
CIS 13 5,24 1,88
Other 28 7,33 2,63
Altogether 364 278,35 100,00
Source: Nepszabadsag, 19 May 1994
2. Table
The yearly increase of the foreign direct investments in Eastern— 
Central-Europe
Million US dollar
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992
Slovakia 5 20 53 130
Bulgaria 10 20 100 130
Romania 20 18 187 240
The Ukraine 10 50 100 280
Poland 60 88 470 830
Czechoslovakia 10 166 200 12 10
Hungary 120 311 1538 13 17
Altogether 235 673 2648 4137
—
Source: East-West Investments and Joint Ventur 
1989- 1993. UN ECE G e nêvÊ.
’t

Table I
Branch Structure of Companies with Foreign Participation In 1992 
(branches In which economic activity was led by at least 20 companies)
I-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¡ Branch Num ber of 
Com panies
1. wholesale trade In consumer goods 737
2. trade with foreign supllers and customers 443
3. miscellaneous services 282
4. production of textile clothes and underwear 259
5. domestic trade In consumer goods 236
S. trade In means of production 229
7. general Investment construction 195
3. production of plastic Items 140
9. public car transport 110
10. publishing of books and periodicals 98
11. furniture and carpentry production 92
12. computer services 82
13. bakery and pastry production 81
14. catering 79
15. fruit and vegetable processing 77
16. fat Industry, household chemistry, cosm etics 62
17. International spedltion 58
18. woodwork Industry 56
19. printing Industry 55
Ü20. Ironware for Industry 54
fo f. metal constructions for Industry 54
|)22. organization of tourist services 54
IJ23. meat Industry 53
|}24. electronic Industry 50
Ü2S. maintenance and services for means of transport 50
|¡26. concrete industry 43 i
|J27. metal constructions 40
28. non-alcohol drinks 39
29. production of other foodstuffs 39
30. hotels 36
31. dairy products processing 36
32. general use ironware 35 I
33. fur and leather clothes Industry 34
34. computer Industry means of Informatics 33
35. other textile Industry products 33
36. sawmill Industry 30
p 7 . knitting and stockings Industry 30  I
38. manufacturing of wood (paper industry) 30
39. shoes Industry 29
40. electro-engineering production 28
D41. production of general purpose cars 28
|42. banks and other financial Institutions 26
43. production of wooden packages 26
44. maschlnery and tools for others branches of industry 24
45. fish Industry 23
46. medical and veterinary equipment 22
Í47. reparings and services of electro-engineering and electronic production 21
(48. pharmaceuticals 21
M9. production of other wooden and willow It^r&f? 20
Source: Data from Central Statistical Office
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Table III
Incomes In Economic Entities and in Companies with 
Foreign Participation In 1992 _____________ ______
Structure of Incomes
Economic
Entities
Companies with 
Foreign Participation
In %
Sectors of National 
Economy
Incomes In
Economic
Entitles
Companies with 
Foreign Participation
Share in
%
in bn zl
1845151 145412
67526 
50938 
6305
7.9
28343
Source: Data from Central Statistical Office
380 1.5
TablelV
Cost Level Indicators and Profitab ility  Rate In Economic
Sectors ol National 
Economy
Cost Level in: Profitability Rate in: Profitability in:
Economic
Entitles
Companies with 
Foreign Participation
Economic
Entitles
Companies with 
Foreign Participation
Economic
Entitles
Companies with
Foreign Participation |
in % in % In % I
Total 96.0 97.2 2.2 2.0 -15.0
----------------- --------------^
in which: 
Trade 98.3 95.2 1.7 4 .9 2 27
Construction 95.2 95.4 4.8 4.2 8 30
Transport 98.3 96.4 0.5 3.1 -25 28
Communication 75.3 183.7 40.1
-47.0 182
-862 I
Industry 96.7 97.9 1.5 0.7 -34
----------------------------------A
•Coal 109.6 92.4 •13.2 12.1 -194 112
-Fuel 95.7 116.0 5.7
-15.0 4
-174
-Power 90.8 88.9 11.7 12.5 48
-17
-Iron and Steel 99.4 99.1 -3.7 1.1 -86 8 |
-Non Ferrous Metallurgy 86.4 97.5 16.1 2.5 49 23
-Metal Products 95.2 93.7 3.0 6.2 •23 47 I
-Engineering 97.0 98.3 -2.6 0.1 -85 ~ 7 |
-Precision Instruments 96.6 96.8 -0.2 2.3 -48 14
•Transport Equipment 105.4 93.5 -11.2 6.0 -160 46
-Electrical Engineering and Electronics 100.5 109.6 -4.2
-10.7 -82 -124
-Chemical 91.8 95.2 7.3 4 .6 2 38 I
-Building Materials 93.7 91.4 3.3 9.0 -55 72
-Glass Products 94.2 98.4 2.1 0.7 -24 0
-Pattery 92.9 160.6 3.7
-11.3 -41
-181 I
-Wood 97.9 102.2 •0.9
-5.0 -39 -54 I
-Paper 95.0 93.4 2.8 4.4
-22
20 I
-Textile 104.8 92.8 -11.9 7.0 -158 60 I
-Wearing Apparel 95.1 95.7 3.3 3.3 1 24
-Leather 103.8 99.8 •9.9 •2.2 •127 •34 I
-Food1 96.3 97.8 3.1 0.8 0 T |l
T a b le  V
Branch Structure of Foreign Investment (end of March 1994)
Brandi
Equity 1 Loans Commitments Total investment Companies
US $ mn Share % US $ mn Share % US $ mn Share % No. Share 1
Industry Total 2166 61.5 3506 81.9 5672 72.7 '131 60
Electro-engineering 725 20.6 2024 47.3 2749 35.2 30 13
Finance 580 16.5 73 1.7 653 8.4 19 8
Food 532 15.1 326 7.6 859 11.0 42 19.
Construction 357 10.1 172 4 529 6.8 17 7.
Cellulose and Paper 279 7.9 255 5.9 534 6.8 12 5.
T elecommunication 237 6.7 413 9.7 650 8.3 11 5.
Chemical 236 6.7 40 0.9 276 3.5 15 6
Trade 155 4.4 116 2.7 270 3.5 31 14.:
Fuel-Power Industry 117 3.3 313 7.3 430 5.5 9 4.'
Mineral 117 3.3 196 4.6 313 4.0 7 31
Light industry 103 2.9 199 4.6 302 3.9 8 3.1
Metal Products 40 1.1 150 3.5 190 2.4 4 11
Other branches 16 0.4 3 0.1 19 0.2 4 1.8
Transport 15 0.4 0 0 15 0.2 5 2.3
Agriculture 8 0.2 0 0 8 0.1 2 0.9
Insurance 4 0.1 0 0 4 0.1 1 0.5
¡Other production 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Municipal Economy 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Forestry 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 3521.7 100 J 4279.7 1 100 | 7801.4 100.0 I 217 100.0
Source: Data of State Agency of Foreign Investment
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POSIÇÂO DE CÂMBIO POR DIVISAS E MÉTODOS DE 
CONTABILIZAÇÂO UNIMONETÁRIOS E PLURIMONETÁRIOS
Resumo
Para ser um recurso válido a informaçâo obtida a partir dos sistemas 
contabilísticos deve apoiar as necessidades de informaçâo da Gestâo. Neste trabalho 
abordamos urna informaçâo contabilística indispensável à gestâo operacional do risco 
de câmbio - o mapa da posiçâo de câmbio por divisas. Este mapa pode ser obtido 
utilizando quer sistemas contabilísticos unimonetários (procedem mediatamente à 
conversâo para moeda nacional de todos os montantes em divisas), quer sistemas 
contabilísticos plurimonetários (registam em partida dobrada as operaçôes na sua 
moeda de origem). Num período de intemacionalizaçâo crescente das empresas e com 
as novas possibilidades que resultam da detençâo de divisas e da cobertura do risco 
de câmbio, a maior segurança que decorre do registo em partida dobrada justifica que 
defendamos os sistemas de contabilidade plurimonetária, pelo menos em empresas 
com um volume elevado de transacçôes em divisas.
Lucia María Pórtela de Lima Rodrigues. Universidade do Minho. Janeiro 1995.
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